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Introduction 
The regulatory story of hedge funds is a remarkable one, especially for an investment class 
born to remain outside any regulatory oversight. Between 1998 and 2005, they became in 
turn: object of legislative and administrative actions and discussions in the US (1998--1999), 
part of a regulatory effort at the international level to promote financial stability (Financial 
Stability Forum: 1999--2002), subject of regulatory debate in the UK (2002 and 2005) and 
Australia (1999), target of a regulatory reform in the US (2003--2004), recipient of warning 
calls by both national (Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of England, 2004) and international 
organizations (World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 2004), and last but not least, 
object of an endless dispute in academic circles over the desirability of their regulation 
(Financial Economists Roundtable 2005; Danielsson et al. 2006 forthcoming).  
 
What is remarkable is not only the number of initiatives in such a short period of time, but 
also the contested nature of their purposes, procedures and outcomes, which caused most of 
them to die halfway through the process or not to reach any substantial conclusion at all. 
When initiatives actually materialized, they divided the very regulatory bodies that 
implemented them – as in the case of the recently--introduced registration of hedge fund 
advisers in the U.S., which split the Board of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 
2004a). What does make the issue of hedge funds so contested?   
 
The article searches for an answer in the first phase of the hedge--fund debate, the one 
triggered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the near--collapse of Long--Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in 1998. The former event brought up issues of market dynamic and 
integrity, 1 while the latter brought up issues of systemic stability2 triggered by the activities 
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of hedge funds. In 1999, G--7 countries decided to tackle both issues by launching an 
international debate at the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in Basel. The FSF debate – which 
took place mostly between 1999 and 2002 – is the focus of this article.  
 
According to participants, the FSF debate was intense and challenging. Yet by 2002, when 
FSF regulators considered it closed, no major reform had been formulated. It is true that 
some recommendations were made, especially in terms of indirect monitoring of hedge 
funds through their counterparties. However, if one compares the situation before and after 
the debate took place one finds only minor differences. Why? 
 
Four explanations are presented. The first is the claim of a good part of the financial, 
academic, and regulatory community, which says that regulation is unnecessary. Hedge funds 
are not posing any serious threat to the financial system and the problem is one of regulatory 
misconception and excessive alarmism. In particular, hedge funds are said to be more likely 
to stabilize than destabilize market equilibrium. By acting as market contrarians,3 the 
argument goes, they bring efficiency and liquidity to the market.  
 
Another set of explanations says that, besides the argument of the benign role of hedge 
funds, it is to be considered that regulatory decisions were taken by a particular group of 
decision--makers, in particular venues and within a particular regulatory discourse. Three 
explanations stem from this approach: one looks at the conflict of interest between FSF 
decision--makers; another one looks at the power of the FSF institutional setting; and the 
last one looks at the power of the discourse within which these issues were debated.  
 
 3
The article analyses these three political--economy explanations and points to the policy 
options that stem from each of them. Methodologically, it draws on elite interviews with 
regulators (especially with the members of the FSF Working Group on hedge funds), 
academics, market commentators, and practitioners.  
 
 
1. Phases and sites of the hedge fund regulatory debate 
Hedge funds are a massively growing investment category. According to the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission, between 1999 and 2004 their assets grew by 260 percent and by 
30 percent in 2004 alone (SEC 2004b). Today they are estimated to be a $1 trillion industry 
with about 8000 funds (Financial Economist Roundtable 2005). They are also said to be very 
active traders and to be responsible for up to 20 percent of equity trading volume only in the 
US (SEC 2004b).  
 
Technically, hedge funds are defined as private investment partnerships that operate largely 
outside any regulatory net and as a consequence have maximum flexibility in their 
investment strategies. An investor protection rationale imposes regulation upon those 
companies collecting money from the broader public, but leaves unregulated those 
partnerships that only accept private placements.4 Hedge funds belong to this category. 
Their clients are high--net--worth individuals or investment companies, which are deemed to 
be in no need of investor protection.  
 
Hedge funds are especially known for the use of two kinds of strategies: the first one 
consists of taking directional bets on the likelihood of changes in macroeconomic indicators 
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such as currency or interest rates; and the second one in trying to profit from perceived 
mispricing among similar assets and from inefficiencies in price formation. Hedge funds 
using the first type of strategy are known as macro funds or currency speculators and were 
active in Asia during 1997. Hedge funds using the second type of strategy are known as 
arbitrage or market neutral funds: an excellent example is LTCM, the US--based hedge fund 
that nearly collapsed in the wake of the emerging market turmoil of 1998.  
 
Since the Asian financial crisis and to a larger extent, the near--collapse of LTCM, hedge 
funds have been among the most cited (and blamed) market actors in discussions of financial 
speculation and have somehow contributed to define the meaning of the term at the turn of 
the century (see for instance Krugman 1999: 119; Chancellor 1999: 335; Marsh 2002: 165). 
The question of whether their regulation could help avoid the recurrence of financial crises 
thus became a cornerstone in discussions on the Global Financial Architecture (GFA). In 
1999, hedge funds were chosen as one of three main issues to be addressed by the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF).5 The FSF Working Group on Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLIs) 
was created along with a specific task force to address the role of hedge funds in the 
emerging market crises of 1997/1998, the Study Group on Market Dynamics. ‘HLI’ was the 
name chosen to identify hedge funds. 
 
Though the FSF debate formally closed by the early 2000s, discussions on hedge funds and 
financial stability have continued to the present. For instance, in November 2005, the FSF 
convened two informal workshops – one in London and one in New York – gathering 
members of the hedge fund community, their counterparts and financial authorities to 
discuss issues pertaining to financial stability (FSF 2005). These meetings confirm that the 
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FSF mandate to monitor hedge fund activities is ongoing. The result of all this conferring, 
however, is not straightforward. The impression is that, after more than 5 years since the 
hedge--fund debate started, regulators are still at the stage of getting to know the hedge fund 
industry and deciding whether something ought to be done. The question that runs 
throughout the article, therefore, is whether this debate is just a ‘much ado about nothing’.  
 
Regulatory actions and statements outside the FSF venue reinforce this impression. In 
November 2004, for instance, the World Bank warned that pension funds and other 
institutions were investing in hedge funds without understanding the risks (Davis 2004). Yet 
in the same year the World Bank invested $1.5 billion of its $12 billion pension fund in 
hedge funds. In December 2004, both the Bank of England and the European Central Bank 
warned that the large and increasing amounts of money flowing into the hedge fund industry 
could have serious financial stability consequences (Bank of England Financial Stability 
Review 2004; ECB 1st Financial Stability Review, Dec 2004). Yet a few months later the EC’s 
internal market commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, warned of the dangers of tightening 
regulation in a sector that proved beneficial to the EU economy (Forbes 2005). In June 
2005, Alan Greenspan once again warned of the systemic-stability risks posed by giant hedge 
funds (Greenspan 2005), but at the same time he kept opposing any regulation on the 
ground that hedge funds contribute to financial stability by increasing market liquidity and 
spreading financial risk (Ibid).  
 
On the one hand, regulators warn about the dangers of hedge funds on financial stability 
ground. On the other hand, they praise the service hedge funds provide to financial markets 
and are adamant against any recommendation that goes beyond a call for due diligence by 
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counterparties. The nature of the hedge fund debate lies in the tension between these two 
attitudes and in the attempt to reconcile them. How can this tension be explained? 
 
The following four sections offer four different answers. The first answer explains the nature 
of the debate in terms of technical necessity: there is no empirical evidence pointing to the 
need and desirability of regulation. The second answer says that the hedge fund problem 
changes with the position a country occupies in the financial system – e.g. advanced 
industrial countries versus emerging markets. The third answer gives an explanation based 
on the institutional setting of the debate; while the fourth answer looks at the regulatory 
discourse within which the debate was constrained. 
 
 
2. The empirical evidence 
‘The analysis […] does not suggest a strong case for supervisory and regulatory 
measures such as these targeted specifically at hedge funds’ (IMF 1998: 4) 
 
‘…[As] a number of independent studies […] [have] suggested, the activities of 
highly leveraged institutions do not appear to have played a significant role in 
precipitating the financial market crises of the past few years’ (The President’s 
Working Group on Financial Markets 1999: xiv) 
 
‘The case for monitoring hedge fund activity has not been made’ (Greenspan 
2004). 
 
The above quotes capture a widespread position among practitioners and regulators: the 
rationale for regulating hedge funds is low. After the Asian financial crisis and the bailout of 
LTCM two main claims were made to dismiss the need for changing the regulatory regime of 
hedge funds. First, it was said that hedge funds’ number and capital under management are 
insignificant if compared to those of other market players engaged in similar activities. 
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Second, it was said that hedge funds are a positive element of the market as they contribute 
to market efficiency. The first point was said to make regulation of hedge funds unnecessary, 
while the second point was said to make it undesirable.  
 
The claim that hedge funds’ number and capital under management are too small to 
represent a threat to the financial system was especially formulated in the IMF Occasional 
Paper Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics (IMF 1998) and in a working paper of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research, Hedge Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of 
1997, (Brown et al. 1998). These studies are referenced in the second quote above (from the 
President’s Working Group).6  
 
The IMF paper argued that, ‘while hedge funds are large in absolute terms they are dwarfed 
by other institutional investors (banks, pension funds, mutual funds), some of which engage 
in many of the same activities as hedge funds’ (IMF 1998: 1). Foreign commercial and 
investment banks, as well as domestic banks and corporations, were said to have played a 
much larger role in the Asian crisis than the one played by hedge funds.  
 
The paper Hedge Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997 made a similar argument 
about hedge funds’ involvement in the crisis. The authors assessed ‘the dollar exposure of 
the top ten global hedge funds to Asian currencies before and during the crisis’ (Brown et al. 
1998: 1) and found that hedge funds were not responsible for the currency attack. One of 
the reasons to dismiss their role was once again the size of their capital compared to other 
players. The total capitalisation of their sample of global--macro funds in September 1997 
was reported to be $29 billion, which was said to pale in significance when compared to the 
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daily volume of foreign exchange (estimated to be in the trillions of dollars) (Ibid: 7). Similar 
arguments were brought forward in the aftermath of the near--failure of LTCM. The 
President Working Group’s report on LTCM pointed out that, although growing in absolute 
terms, hedge funds were still small compared to other industries (PWG 1999: 2). Why should 
regulation of hedge funds be enforced, it was concluded, if regulated entities were much 
more relevant than hedge funds in all of the crisis events under inquiry?  
 
These papers were not well received among emerging markets and in general among those 
economies that suffered the consequences of the currency attacks. The IMF paper in 
particular was said to confuse the issue by comparing the capabilities of hedge funds with 
those of banks, without considering that in Thailand and Malaysia the size of hedge funds 
was considerable in relation to the size of those domestic markets. Some countries also 
questioned the very methodology of the paper, which only relied upon interviews with hedge 
fund managers and which was prepared by professionals with strong links to the hedge fund 
industry. Later on these criticisms found support in some of the conclusions of the FSF 
Task Force on hedge funds and market dynamics (FSF 2000). For example, the FSF Task 
Force reported that in 1998 in the Hang Seng futures (Hong Kong futures market) there was 
one instance when ‘three hedge funds accounted for around half of the net open interest7 of 
the entire market while one fund accounted for a third’ (FSF 2000: 119). 
 
By 2006, hedge funds account for a large market share in advanced industrial countries too, 
and can no longer be seen as quantitatively irrelevant. This new awareness was clearly 
manifested in a 2004 SEC note discussing the registration of certain categories of hedge fund 
advisers.  
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One concern is the tremendous growth in the industry. While no one knows for sure, 
it is estimated that in the last five years, hedge funds have grown by 260 percent [and 
in] the last year alone, hedge fund assets have grown over 30 percent. Hedge funds are 
one fifth the size of equity mutual funds, but are growing at a much faster rate. 
Moreover, hedge funds tend to be very active traders. One study estimates hedge 
funds are responsible for up to 20 percent of equity trading volume in the United 
States. […] This growth and potential impact on our markets simply cannot be 
ignored (Paul Roy, SEC 2004b). 
 
The quantitative irrelevance of hedge funds, therefore, no longer holds up. The second claim 
was that of the efficiency--enhancing role of hedge funds. This claim was brought forward 
especially after the near--collapse of LTCM. LTCM was an arbitrage fund, one of those 
hedge funds seeking to profit from inefficiently priced assets. They buy under--priced 
securities and sell short over--priced ones, betting that the spread between the two assets 
narrows. By doing so, they are supposed to help markets achieve equilibrium and thus 
enhance efficiency. The high consideration hedge funds are held in, however, does not stop 
at the category of arbitrage funds. All hedge funds are attributed some sort of efficiency--
enhancing behavior and the reason is to be found at the very heart of financial theory.  
 
Contemporary financial theory and practice revolves around the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), which postulates a link between the efficiency of the market and the rational 
behaviour of the investors herein. A complement to the EMH is the Theory of Arbitrage, 
which says that, even if investors are irrational, markets can still be efficient thanks to the 
operation of rational arbitrageurs, which by acting as ‘market contrarians’ help prices go back 
to their equilibrium level (Friedman 1953; Fama 1965). In Fama’s formulation, the Theory of 
Arbitrage says that:  
[I]f there are many sophisticated traders […] they will be able to recognise 
situations where the price of a common stock is beginning to run up above its 
intrinsic value. Since they expect the price to move eventually back toward its 
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intrinsic value, they have an incentive to sell this security or sell it short (Fama 
1965: 38) 
 
Sophisticated traders/arbitrageurs are not only perfectly rational and able to recognise the 
fundamental value of an asset, but are also able to correct other investors’ irrationality. By 
doing so, they will earn a net profit for themselves and bring prices in line with their 
fundamental values. Arbitrageurs thus become for the EMH what the invisible hand is for 
the theory of perfect competition.  
 
All those speaking against regulation of hedge funds both during and after the FSF debate 
drew upon this argument. Alan Greenspan, for instance, argued that: 
 “Hedge funds have become major contributors to the flexibility of our financial 
system. […]Taking positions in volume, as hedge funds do, tends to eliminate 
the abnormal profits and the inefficiencies by aligning prices across markets and 
provides liquidity to markets” (Greenspan as quoted in MFA 2005). 
 
The EMH has been increasingly contested both inside and outside academic circles. The 
strongest critique comes from behavioral finance, which has questioned the efficiency--
enhancing role of arbitrage on the basis of two considerations. The first is that in real world 
financial markets perfect substitutes among securities are extremely rare. If securities have 
only imperfect substitutes, they will be subject to different fundamental news/shocks: when 
arbitrageurs buy the undervalued asset and sell short the overvalued one, they bear the risk 
of further mispricing (Shleifer 2000). The mispricing is mainly attributed to investors’ 
overreaction and under--reaction to news (Shiller 1998; Sheifer 2000; De Bondt and Thaler 
1993). This, however, was already pointed out in Fama’s model. More interesting is the 
second consideration that behavioural financial economists make, that is, that arbitrageurs 
might find it more profitable to follow instead of to contrast investors’ irrationality. For 
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instance, they can accentuate and reinforce an upward trend in the price of an asset only to 
sell the asset short later on at a profit. (Short selling means selling assets that the seller does 
not own on the expectation that their price will go down by the time of repayment.) In this 
way, both the overvaluing and undervaluing of securities is not only the mere effect of 
investors’ irrational trades, but results from the purposeful activities of sophisticated traders. 
This effect is called the ‘bandwagon effect’ and has been documented in several episodes of 
hedge fund investing (e.g. conglomerate boom of the 1960s; the REIT boom of the 1970s; 
Internet bubble of 2000). Recent studies on the Internet bubble show that hedge funds were 
‘riding the bubble’ instead of bringing prices back to their fundamental value. In other 
words, it was more profitable for them to keep pushing prices up before shorting the stocks, 
which disproves Fama’s model of rational arbitrageurs (Brunnermeier and Nagel 2003; 
Temin and Voth 2003). Along the same line, sociologists have pointed at various forms of 
‘social connectivities’ – e.g. imitation, reciprocal monitoring of each other’s trading – to 
challenge the efficiency--enhancing role of arbitrageurs (MacKenzie 2003; 2004). 
 
These considerations partly undermine the argument that the regulation of hedge funds is 
unnecessary if not undesirable. Consequently, the reason why the FSF initiative has achieved 
little regulatory substance must be searched for somewhere else. The following sections 
make this search in three directions: Section 3 looks at power relations among decision--
makers, Section 4 at the power of the institutional structure, and Section 5 at the power of 
the regulatory discourse.  
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3. Conflicts of interest at the FSF table 
This section argues that the FSF debate did not reach any substantial conclusion due to the 
conflicts of interest at the regulatory table. To understand these conflicts, it is first necessary 
to describe the composition of the FSF Working Group on HLIs (from now onward ‘FSF 
Group’). The FSF Group gathered representatives of the G-7, the Netherlands, Australia 
and Hong Kong. It also included a representative from the IMF. Altogether, it counted 12 
members (Table 1). Australia and Hong Kong were invited to represent those countries 
where hedge funds were active in 1998.  
 
Table 1 – Financial Stability Forum Working Group on HLIs: composition 
National authorities G--7 countries  
Canada        David Brown (IOSCO; Ontario Securities Commission) 
France              Jean--Pierre Patat (Banque de France; Committee on the                         
Global Financial System) 
Germany     Dietrich Jahn (Ministry of Finance) 
Italy             Giovanni Sabatini (CONSOB) 
Japan                Takashi Oyama (Bank of Japan) 
Netherlands Jan W. Brockmeijer (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and De 
Nederlandsche Bank) 
United 
Kingdom 
Howard Davies (Chairman) Financial Services Authority 
United States Peter R. Fisher (Federal Reserve Bank of New York and 
Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Public Disclosure)  
Edwin M. Truman (Department of the Treasury) 
National authorities non G--7 
Australia Ric Battelino (Reserve Bank of Australia) 
Hong Kong Norman T. L. Chan (Hong Kong Monetary Authority, HK SAR) 
International Financial Institutions (1)
IMF  Charles Adams (IMF) 
Secretariat 
 Svein Andresen (FSF Secretariat, Basel) 
 Verena Ross (FSA, UK) 
 Adam Shapiro (FSA, UK) 
 Andrew Sykes (FSA, UK) 
Source: FSF 2000 (my elaboration) 
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The major conflict was between G-7 countries on the one hand, and emerging markets on 
the other. The former were concerned with the systemic stability impact of a large hedge 
fund collapsing and bringing down with it a good part of the financial system. This was 
identified as Pillar I in the Group’s agenda: issues of systemic stability – i.e. LTCM type of 
problems. The latter were concerned with the effect that hedge funds’ concentrated 
positions could have on their markets. This was identified as Pillar II: issues of market 
dynamics and integrity – i.e. Asian-crisis type of problems.  
 
Pillar II was particularly controversial and, as participants acknowledge, only a minor 
consensus could be reached on it. 8 This can be evidenced by looking at the final list of 
recommendations that the Group issued in March 2000 (Table 2).  Only two 
recommendations concern Pillar II (Numbers 9 and 10) and they do so not by tackling 
hedge funds but rather domestic financial systems in emerging markets. Despite 
acknowledging that hedge funds might have exacerbated the macro--economic situation 
during the Asian crisis and in the immediate aftermath (FSF 2000: 118-126), the Group 
concluded that there was no sufficient evidence of their culpability and that, ‘provided the 
economic fundamentals are strong, HLI positions and strategies are unlikely to present a 
threat to stability’ (FSF 2000: 19). As for the issue of aggressive trading, though some 
practices were seen to constitute market manipulation, ‘the working group as a whole was 
not […] able to reach a firm conclusion on the scale of these practices and the implications 
for market integrity’ (ibid). 
 
Another conflict was determined by the fact that emerging markets, especially in Asia, were 
on average in favor of mandatory regulation, while advanced industrial countries were more 
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inclined to market--led solutions.9 On this issue, however, the two groups were not 
monolithic. Among G--7 countries, France and Germany were overall more concerned with 
the problems raised by hedge funds and they too advocated a more mandatory approach to 
their regulation. Some participants even talk of an unbridgeable ‘philosophical division’. This 
division was apparent in the discussions on two proposals that France and Germany 
advanced: the proposal to enhance aggregate disclosure on positions in key markets such as 
foreign exchange markets and the proposal to introduce an international credit register. The 
former, which was brought forward by the French representative and previously considered 
by the Committee on the Global Financial System, was discussed in the context of Pillar II. 
The proposal was opposed by the US representatives and by the industry10 and did not 
proceed further. The FSF report mentions several limitations, ‘including the difficulty in 
obtaining compliance, the feasibility of producing the data in a timely manner, and the 
substantial costs involved’ (FSF 2000: 40). Yet, other FSF members argued that the proposal 
was ‘politically and technically doable and that, despite some difficulties, it could have been 
implemented given the current state of technological advance. The proposal to set up an 
international credit register (ICR) was advanced by the German delegate in order to track 
counterparties’ exposures to hedge funds and was discussed in the context of Pillar I. It was 
opposed for three main reasons: (1) hedge funds rarely receive credit; (2) their operations are 
mostly off-balance sheet; and, (3) information on emerging markets is lacking, so that data 
cannot be comprehensive. In the end, the proposal was not taken seriously, though its 
proponents argued that meaningful data could be collected through an ICR.  
 
Efforts in the end focused on Pillar I and, within it, on two sets of recommendations: those 
calling for indirect regulation of hedge funds through their counterparties 
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(Recommendations 1, 3 and 4 in Table 2) and those calling for enhanced disclosure and risk 
management through voluntary industry initiatives (recommendations 2 and 7 in Table 2). 
Clearly, consensus was tipped towards the preferences of G-7 countries, mostly interested in 
Pillar I, and, within this group, towards the advocates of a non-mandatory approach geared 
on indirect- and self-regulation. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2. Eight out of 
ten recommendations concern Pillar I and only two Pillar II. In addition, as said before, the 
two recommendations that concern Pillar II do not tackle hedge funds but rather domestic 
financial systems in emerging markets. Among Pillar I recommendations, only two directly 
address hedge funds (2 and 7), and they do so by relying upon hedge funds’ voluntary 
disclosure and risk management efforts. Most recommendations call for counterparties 
(banks, securities firms, prime brokers) to indirectly monitor hedge funds. 
 
Table 2 – FSF Report: main recommendations 
Recommendations Pillar 1 or 2 Addressing 
hedge funds 
Addressing hedge funds’ 
counterparties 
(1) Stronger 
counterparty risk 
management 
1  X 
(2) Stronger risk 
management by 
hedge funds 
 
1 
 
X 
 
(3) Enhanced 
regulatory oversight 
of HLI credit 
providers 
 
1 
  
X 
(4) Greater risk 
sensitivity in bank 
capital adequacy 
regulation 
 
1 
  
X 
(5) Sustaining 
industry progress 
1  X 
(6) Building a firmer 
market infrastructure 
1  X 
(7) Enhanced public 
disclosure by HLIs 
1 X  
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(8) Enhanced public 
disclosure practices 
generally 
 
1 
 
 
 
(9) Enhanced 
national surveillance 
of financial market 
activity 
 
2 
 
 
 
(10) Good practice 
guidelines for foreign 
exchange trading 
 
2 
 
 
 
Source: data from FSF 2000: 2--4 (my elaboration). 
 
The consensus reached on Pillar I, however, did not wipe out the conflicts present at the 
regulatory table but transferred them at a different level, outside the decision-making process 
in Basel. Due to the nature of the solution achieved, the conflict became one of private 
versus public interests or, more precisely, a conflict between private actors’ incentives and 
regulators’ goals.  
 
The recommendations on enhanced disclosure and risk management by hedge funds 
(Numbers 2 and 7 in Table 2) rested on the voluntary codes of conduct that the hedge fund 
and banking industries issued between 1999 and 2000. This solution had already been 
adopted in the US during its domestic debate on hedge funds, sparked by the near-collapse 
of LTCM.11 The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG), made up of 12 
Western banks and securities firms, issued the report Improving Counterparty Risk 
Management Practices (CRMPG 1999), while a group of five large hedge funds issued the 
report Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers (2000). By delegating disclosure 
responsibilities to private actors, the Group opened the possibility to the fact that banks’ and 
hedge funds’ incentives could conflict with those of regulators.  
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To begin with, it is not clear whether the five hedge funds that drafted the report managed 
to adopt all of their own recommendations (Temple 2001: 187), despite the fact that they 
should be an example for the rest of the industry (FSF 2000: 25). Even in case of full 
implementation, however, their recommendations would be flawed because of the 
strenuously defended non-disclosure of proprietary information – which was re-stated in an 
update of the hedge funds’ report in 2005 (Sound Practices 2000: 24; MFA’s 2005 Sound 
Practices). Without this disclosure, the working of market discipline is greatly limited 
(Temple 2001: 187). For instance, although LTCM was reporting VaR information before its 
collapse, it did not include proprietary data. Without these data, it would have been difficult 
to know which risks its VaR models referred to (FSF official, interview 2003). In addition, 
the very use of VaR to measure risk is of little use in the case of hedge funds, since they can 
employ complicated trading strategies to lower or hide losses (Danielsson 2004). In 2001 the 
Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure, another Basel grouping made up 
of both private and public sector officials,12 was rather pessimistic on the achievements in 
terms of disclosure ‘both on the part of regulated and unregulated firms (MWGED 2001). 
Five years since, participants are still unable to say whether substantial changes occurred in 
the industry. 
 
The other leg of Pillar I consensus was the idea of indirectly regulating hedge funds through 
their counterparties. This was by far the most important set of recommendations that the 
Group issued (Recommendations 1, 3 and 4). Since hedge funds depended on their 
counterparties for credit and other services (e.g. prime brokerage) and since those 
institutions were already regulated, it was argued, the best option was to regulate/supervise 
hedge funds through them. Some commentators (e.g. Eichengreen 2003) argue that 
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counterparties have placed hedge funds on a stricter credit diet and that this should pose less 
of a risk than before. Is it really so?  
 
The idea of indirect regulation is based on two assumptions: the first assumption is that 
counterparties are adequately regulated and supervised in relation to their business with 
HLIs; the second assumption is that counterparties and regulators share the same agenda, 
that is, that counterparties have sufficient incentives to comply.13 These assumptions will be 
tested in the case of commercial and investment banks, which are the largest prime brokers 
for the hedge fund industry.  
 
The nature of the contracts that banks enter into with hedge funds makes effective 
supervision extremely difficult. Banks do not simply lend money to hedge funds – a rather 
straightforward operation. They mainly provide them with credit through securities lending 
and derivative transactions. Securities lending gets particularly complex with the use of 
reverse repurchase agreements and contracts for difference,14 which are both means to 
quickly and inexpensively leverage hedge funds’ capital. It is difficult for counterparties’ 
supervisors to track the many ways by which assets are used as collateral for different 
transactions and what this implies in terms of risk.  
 
Supervisors cannot exercise control by relying upon the information banks release to the 
public (annual reports, etc.). This is because data on banks’ transactions with hedge funds are 
either buried in larger categories such as net interest, securities fees, etc. or are not reported 
at all. Supervisors might be equally unable to exercise this control by relying upon the 
information that banks confidentially disclose to them. This is because information on each 
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transaction and customer is not available, unless the bank has a large exposure to one single 
client, in which case it has to report it. Outside large-exposure cases, information about 
banks’ clients is precluded, as it is part of a bank’s confidentiality clause. In any case, what 
regulators are able to know is the total net exposure by a counterparty, which means the total 
exposure a bank has to a hedge fund after all its transactions with it have been combined and 
netted. However, as a Fed official pointed out, there is no certainty that the netting is 
capturing all the risks. Another important piece of information that regulators miss is the 
aggregate exposures to any single hedge fund by all its counterparties – and the previous 
pages showed that the FSF dismissed the need to collect aggregate statistics on banks’ 
exposures to hedge funds, including the need of an international credit register (FSF 2000: 
8).  
 
Has anything changed since the near-collapse of LTCM and the FSF debate? The opinions 
of regulators are split over this issue. Some of them think that banks and supervisors now 
pay more attention to the quality of risk management. As a Basel official said, ‘in the US 
post--LTCM world, the ability of banks to disregard supervisors has diminished, so that 
supervisors have more power in redirecting banks towards desired risk management 
policies’. Other Basel officials are less optimistic and argue that the capacity of supervisors to 
get a grasp of banks’ activities with hedge funds should not be overestimated. As Crockett 
writes, ‘consider […] how little counterparties knew about the exposures of LTCM. And 
how little information is still available about the risk profiles of financial institutions 
generally’ (Crockett 2001, my italics). According to another BIS official, supervising banks’ 
transactions with hedge funds can be part (a small part) of the supervisory process, but it is 
not a high level inquiry: ‘It is more an issue of credit risk management by banks than the job 
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of supervisors: it is impossible to supervise these aspects’. In addition, exposures to hedge 
funds are really quick. Sometimes banks do not even know who the counterparty is (e.g. for 
certain swap agreements).  
 
Further obstacles are encountered in the case of investment banks. It has to be remembered 
that banking supervisors in the US15 have jurisdiction over commercial banks but not over 
investment banks. Investment banks such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are under 
the oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but only for what concerns 
their broker/dealer activities. Anything that is put outside the broker/dealer activity is not 
supervised. For instance, Goldman Sachs’s derivatives transactions are in principle under the 
SEC jurisdiction, but since Goldman Sachs does not keep them inside the broker/dealer 
division, its derivatives transactions are not filed with the SEC. They might even be under a 
foreign jurisdiction (e.g. the Financial Services Authority in London) if Goldman Sachs 
executes them as a stand--alone operation in another country. The same applies to contracts 
for difference and repurchase agreements, which are covered by the SEC but only if the 
broker/dealer chooses to conduct its activity in the US. Furthermore, the activities executed 
in different countries are not aggregated, that is, they are not added to the overall activity of 
Goldman Sachs. The SEC, in fact, has responsibility for brokerage but not consolidated 
oversight of it. Things have started changing with the new Basel Accord and especially with 
the new European Financial Conglomerates Directive (2002), which prompted the SEC to 
issue a rule that would bring investment banks in line with their commercial counterparts. 
Yet these changes were not present when the FSF issued its recommendations and even 
now, in 2006, it is difficult to evaluate how they will affect the way banking supervision is 
executed.  
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 In principle the difficulty of monitoring the activities of banks explains why regulators are 
more inclined to delegate to banks and counterparties in general most of the work of 
monitoring and controlling HLIs. But are banks willing to do so? Is the assumption that 
banks and regulators share the same agenda tenable? Two developments in particular 
question the assumption that it is in banks’ self--interest to perform due diligence in their 
dealing with hedge funds in the post--LTCM scenario. First, banks have started acquiring or 
creating their own ‘satellite’ hedge funds. Second, banks have found a very profitable 
business in the provision of prime brokerage and other services to the hedge fund industry. 
This second point is particularly important. Banks have realised that they make more money 
with the margins they gain from this kind of operation than by playing the market 
themselves. By acting as prime brokers, banks are going to cash in the fees no matter what 
will happen to the currency or the equity market, so that their operations are even more 
profitable than that of hedge funds – and this without taking open positions.  
 
Hedge funds need to borrow securities in order to sell short. Banks – especially investment 
banks – can provide this service. By doing so, they earn an interest on the proceeds of the 
short selling, trading and clearing commissions, and income from derivative transactions. 
Since hedge funds are heavy short sellers, the more they short the more banks find business 
with them profitable (Forbes 1998). It is difficult to exactly quantify the gains that banks 
make from the provision of prime brokerage services, since no bank or financial house 
breaks out revenues derived from dealing with hedge funds. Yet an estimate can be obtained 
by looking at items such as net interest income or securities services and fees. In 2001, for 
instance, Goldman Sachs saw its net interest revenues increased by 46 percent over 1999 and 
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Morgan Stanley by 20 percent over 1997 (Goldman Sachs 2001 Annual Report; Morgan 
Stanley 2001 Annual Report). Also, banks started competing over the slice of the hedge fund 
industry they serve as prime brokers. With increased competition, margins from prime 
brokerage are getting slimmer (FSF 2002: 4). This is another reason why banks have an 
interest in hedge funds trading more aggressively rather than more prudentially, as the FSF 
requires.  
 
This conclusion is important, since the whole debate on hedge funds, from the publication 
of the FSF report in 2000 onwards, has revolved around the idea of indirect regulation. 
When in 2005 the FSF convened a series of workshops gathering regulators, hedge funds 
and their counterparties (FSF 2005), the purpose was once again to call for supervision by 
hedge funds’ prime brokers. When Alan Greenspan in the same year argued that ‘the case 
for monitoring hedge fund activity has not been made’, he continued saying that ‘if there 
were a public policy reason to monitor hedge fund activity, the best way of doing so […] 
would be indirectly through oversight of those broker--dealers that clear, settle and finance 
trades for hedge funds’ (Greenspan 2004).  
 
Yet the reliance upon banks and other credit providers to control hedge funds’ leverage and 
risk might be misplaced if banks are the first to profit from high levels of leverage and 
aggressive trading. In order to work, indirect regulation through banks needs a powerful 
system of supervision and a strong system of incentives for banks to exercise due diligence. 
If, as the analysis in this section shows, both these systems are weak, efforts to make indirect 
regulation work are bound to be difficult. The reliance on indirect regulation provides 
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another example of how conflicts at the FSF decision-making level translated into conflicts 
between private and public interests in the implementation phase.  
 
 
4. The Institutional Setting 
The previous section showed the nature of the conflicting interests in the FSF debate in 
Basel and how the preferences of G--7 countries – and of the US more specifically – 
prevailed. It also showed how these preferences moved the conflict at the level of private 
versus private interests, where the lack of incentives for hedge funds and counterparties to 
comply undermined the effectiveness of the Group’s core recommendations.  
 
The analysis so far focused on overt conflicts as expressed in the decisions taken by the FSF 
Group. It did not account for the fact that non-decisions might be equally crucial to 
understand the dynamics of a decision-making process and that conflicts might be hidden by 
a particular institutional setting. According to Lukes’ distinction between the one-- and two--
dimensional views of power, covert conflicts are those that cannot reach the decision-
making level because the institutional setting confines the agenda to those issues that are 
‘safer’ for the most powerful actors (two-dimensional view, Lukes 1974: 238). More 
generally, the institutional setting of a debate can make it particularly hard for certain claims 
to come forward and be given proper attention.  
 
Institutions are herein understood not just as formal organizations (e.g. the Bank for 
International Settlements) but more generally as the rules and norms governing these 
bodies.16 The classical question that a regime--theory analyst would pose is: Was the 
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institutional setting at the FSF likely to foster cooperation or to promote the will of the 
strong? An answer will be provided by looking at three sets of FSF rules: (1) those governing 
the setting of the agenda, (2) those governing the way decisions were taken; and (3) those 
governing the evaluation of results.  
 
To understand the agenda-setting rules – including the definition and naming of the problem 
– it is necessary to look at the composition and statutory principles of the FSF. To begin 
with, the decision to address hedge funds in an international forum grew inside the G-7 
(Crockett, interview 2003). Australia and Hong Kong were invited to participate in the works 
of the FSF as a way ‘to reach out to non--G7 countries and by so doing gain credibility’ 
(Ibid). They remained, however, ‘guests’ in a house they did not contribute to build.  
 
The membership rule at the FSF is three representatives for each G--7 country and only one 
for any non--G--7 country. An exception was made in the case of the US, which was allowed 
to keep two representatives. In a 12--member committee, this was bound to make a 
difference at the regulatory table, especially since the US representatives had the greatest 
experience and expertise on hedge funds. This does not mean that the other FSF members 
did not have competence on the issues debated. The US, however, was the only country 
together with the UK to have direct familiarity with hedge funds – which at the time did not 
exist in France, Italy, Germany or Japan.  
 
Finally, to follow an old convention in international affairs, the FSF Working Group on 
hedge funds was ‘assigned’ to the UK. The balance between countries had to be maintained 
in the appointment of the chairmen of the three FSF working groups (HLIs, capital flows 
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and offshore centers): one had to be European, one North American and one from the UK. 
Howard Davies, Chairman of the Financial Services Authority (FSA), was appointed for the 
Working Group on HLIs. As a result, the Group was somehow hosted by the FSA: three 
out of four of the Secretariat members were from the FSA. This was not going to be without 
consequences, given the fact that London and Washington shared the same view on the 
hedge--fund problem.  
 
Not only the composition, but the very principles of the FSF house are biased towards G--7 
countries. In its statutory objectives, the FSF sets itself as a forum for ‘national authorities 
responsible for financial stability in significant international financial centers’ (FSF 1999). 
This entails that the FSF is bound to deal with issues affecting leading financial markets.  
This can be seen in the very naming of the problem in terms of ‘highly leveraged 
institutions’, which since the beginning tipped the debate towards Pillar I. There was 
certainly the need to stress that hedge funds are more numerous than a couple of macro 
global funds and thus a change of name was in principle desirable. Yet the choice of the 
name ‘HLIs’ was not neutral. It implied that hedge funds and equivalent vehicles raise 
concerns because of the high levels of leverage they can accumulate, which only accounts for 
half of the problem. Hedge funds can raise concerns even when they do not accumulate high 
levels of leverage. As the FSF report acknowledges, reduced leverage may not be enough to 
address the concerns of small open economies, as ‘[e]ven with reduced overall leverage, 
HLIs could still build large foreign exchange positions relative to these markets’ (FSF 2000: 
39). In other words, high leverage is a concern for LTCM--type crises (Pillar I concerns), but 
not necessarily for what happened in Asia in 1997 (Pillar II concerns).  
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As for the rules governing the way decisions are taken, the FSF only works by consensus. 
This in principle foreshadows a participatory and legitimate system of global governance 
(Germain 2002), but it can also be a way to confine decision--making to ‘safe issues’ (Lukes 
1974). In the case of the debate on hedge funds, countries began negotiating from very 
different starting points and did not considerably change their positions in the course of the 
process. A consensus in this situation could have been struck only at the cost of lowering the 
common denominator countries could agree to. In the case of Pillar II this denominator was 
so low that the consensus was achieved only on irrelevant recommendations – e.g. guidelines 
for foreign exchange trading. As a member of the Group said, ‘you reach a consensus by 
writing a report that says very little and whose final proposals are “hot air”: everyone agrees 
on it, but its substance is almost nil’. In addition, there are further grounds to be pessimistic 
about the modality of consensual decision--making. A consensus creates a set of guidelines 
that are supposed to be followed by both participating and non--participating countries. It 
creates, in other words, a ‘regime’, intended as the normalization of a previously contested 
issue rather than an order--supporting mechanism as in neo--realist approaches. Cox’s 
definition of regime as institutionalised hegemony, where institutionalisation is the means to 
stabilise and perpetuate a particular order (Cox 1996: 219), can partly explain the FSF 
process. The comment of a Basel official enlightens this point. He said that, ‘the aim of the 
FSF Working Group was to have a political consensus on what to do and put this issue to 
bed’. To paraphrase Jenny Edkins, consensus might produce a situation where issues ‘are 
even more firmly constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form’ 
(Edkins 1999: 11). To conclude, it might be true that participating countries formally agreed 
on a set of recommendations. Consensus, however, was achieved by confining the decision--
making process to issues that were relatively safe for the dominant actors.  
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 Moving to the last phase of the rule--making procedure, i.e. how recommendations are 
implemented, another institutional fragility is evident: an enforcing mechanism that can 
ensure compliance in each domestic setting is lacking. As Eichengreen points out, the FSF 
Group delegated many initiatives, especially the ones on disclosure, to national regulators 
(2003). Delegation to the national level, however, requires that a mechanism is in place to 
monitor and evaluate results, which was not the case with the FSF Group. For instance, the 
FSF took for granted that US regulators implemented domestic initiatives to improve 
disclosure of hedge fund activities, but no instrument was in place to assess whether those 
initiatives had been implemented according to schedule. Reference is to the introduction to 
the US Congress of two bills, the Baker and the Markey bill, respectively, in 1999. These 
bills, which required some form of disclosure of hedge fund activities, had never been 
enacted and eventually died in 2000 with the end of the 106th Congress. Given the emphasis 
that the FSF Group placed on the US initiatives, the very fact that they were not 
implemented undermined the process in Basel.  
 
In summary, the institutional setting where the debate took place was tipped towards the 
preferences of a particular constituency. Other issues and problems could have been 
included in the agenda – or the very way of addressing hedge funds could have been altered 
– under different rule-making procedures.  The composition and statutory principles of the 
FSF, the rule of consensus in decision making, and the lack of proper ex--post evaluation 
procedures helped promote the preferences of the US and, more generally, of G--7 
countries. With this conclusion, this institutionalist perspective re--enforces the argument 
made in the previous section.  
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5. The regulatory discourse 
The assumption behind the explanations in Sections 3 and 4 is that there are well--identified 
conflicts of interest among the participants in the debate – in the first case they are overt, 
while in the second case they are suffocated within a particular institutional setting. Both 
explanations do not account for the fact that most concerns simply fail to be perceived as 
such and do not generate neither overt nor covert conflicts. For this reason the article 
proposes to look at the structure of meaning or discourse within which the debate was 
carried out and to the limits it poses to any critical understanding of regulatory options.      
 
Discourse is herein defined as an apparatus ‘which makes possible the separation […] of 
what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’ (Foucault 1980: 197). It is not, 
however, only an episteme or body of ideas. When Foucault defines discourse as a dispositif 
or apparatus, he refers to ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative reforms, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much 
as the unsaid. […] The apparatus is also always linked to certain co--ordinates of knowledge 
which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it’ (Foucault 1980: 196--197).  
 
This model of analysis can be applied to the regulatory discourse within which issues of 
hedge funds were dealt with. The co--ordinates of knowledge of this discourse will be 
identified in the primacy given to a particular definition of financial systemic stability and in 
the efficiency--enhancing role attributed to hedge funds. Another important point that is 
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captured by this model is that the ‘said’ in a discourse is as important as the ‘unsaid’ or, more 
precisely, that both are part of the apparatus. This provides a link to and, at the same time, a 
differentiation from Lukes’s two--dimensional view of power. As much as the two--
dimensional view (analysed in the previous section) is concerned with non--decisions and 
what is intentionally kept outside the political agenda, Foucault is concerned with what 
discourse does not say or prevents from being said. The concept of apparatus, however, goes 
beyond the two--dimensional view of power. The latter explores what is kept outside the 
political agenda because of a clearly--defined conflict between dominant and marginal 
interests. For the former, instead, issues are kept outside the policy agenda without a 
deliberate struggle. Battles are not only ‘at the level of wanting or resisting a particular policy 
initiative, but at the level of constituting the shape of the issue to be considered’ (Bacchi 
1999: 50). Instead of looking solely at what is intentionally kept outside the regulatory table, 
a discourse approach reflects upon the fact that only certain grievances can be formulated 
and only certain problems can be thought of (Ibid: 49). As Shapiro says with reference to 
urban policy in Los Angeles, decision--makers are not faced with problems that exist out 
there, but create those problems in the very process of targeting them. Talking about public 
policy in LA, Shapiro writes:  
“[T]raffic congestion”, which receives more space than any other urban problem, is 
a middle--class problem, in that it accepts the already--produced segregation, 
housing, and shaping of the labour force that has arisen from the structures of real 
estate speculation, work force creation, city planning, and so on. Traffic congestion 
is a “complaint” from those who are in a position to vocalise: it does not access the 
production and distribution of such position (Shapiro 1992: 99--100). 
 
This article makes a similar argument about the problem of financial systemic stability, the 
first coordinate of the hedge--fund regulatory discourse. Here the word ‘systemic’ conceals 
the fact that stability (1) is mainly defined as a G--7 problem and (2) measures to restore it 
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serve the interest of only one section of the market, notably the self-regulating one. The FSF 
debate on hedge funds provides a good case in point. 
 
As shown above, the two pillars of the hedge fund debate concerned: (1) the sudden 
liquidation of a highly leveraged fund and the domino effect that this can have on the 
financial system; and (2) the impact of aggressive trading strategies and the accumulation of 
large and concentrated positions in small open economies. The former were said to be issues 
of systemic stability, while the latter were said to be issues of market dynamics and integrity. 
The stability of the system, in other words, was made dependent upon the prevention of 
LTCM--type of failures, which, as explained above, mainly concern advanced financial 
markets. While financial stability should in principle be defined as including any type of 
financial crisis, this was not the case in the FSF debate, where the role of hedge funds in 
currency crises in emerging markets was taken out of the stability heading. This had two 
major consequences. First, given the importance that is currently attributed to financial 
stability considerations, this decision implicitly relegated concerns for market dynamics and 
integrity in emerging markets as secondary problems. Second, neglect for the second pillar 
could have been justified by saying that it was outside the FSF priority areas, which is what 
happened in the course of the Basel debate. As a Basel official said, ‘the FSF was there 
primarily for issues of systemic stability; its terms of reference are on systemic stability; […] 
and many countries were not concerned about market integrity, as it does not affect their 
markets’. This shows how the enormous emphasis that is currently devoted to financial 
stability serves to keep other issues and concerns outside the policy agenda (the ‘unsaid’).  
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To analyse the measures adopted to restore stability, the concept of financial systemic 
stability needs to be analysed in its historical perspective. Stability is one of today’s most 
central concerns in finance and has catalysed a variety of initiatives (including the very 
creation of the Financial Stability Forum).17 It is no exaggeration to say it has become ‘the’ 
concern in discussions of the global financial architecture. The prevention and management 
of any sort of market failure and crisis have been included under its heading. Yet the concept 
is less inclusive than it might appear at first sight. 
 
Concerns for financial instability rose with the resurgence of a market--led, as opposed to a 
government--led, financial system. It is only when this resurgence was complete (at the end 
of the 20th century) that episodes of financial instability became more prominent. LTCM is 
an episode when market discipline broke down (Crockett 2001). Mechanisms to ensure 
financial stability thus became the counterbalancing effect of having an increasingly market--
driven regulation. In other words, the stress on financial stability is a direct consequence of a 
financial system that increasingly relies upon private actors’ due diligence in order to remain 
sound. 
 
When measures to achieve financial stability are discussed, however, they are made 
dependent upon responsible behaviour (due diligence) by each player in the market. In 
circular reasoning, the cause of instability and the restoring of stability are made identical: 
reliance on private actors’ self--assessment of risk. It is here that due diligence becomes 
tightly linked to financial stability and regulators tightly dependent upon the behaviour of the 
institutions they should supervise. In conclusion, systemic stability becomes the stability of a 
self-assessed market. 
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 Since at least the 1970s, a whole structure of meaning has given sense to projects and 
recommendations directed at enhancing market discipline. It was not simply a question of 
theories and ideas, but of a very ‘apparatus’, according to the definition given above, made 
up of financial concepts, models, instruments, strategies and institutions. Huge resources 
have gone into perfecting private actors’ self--assessment of risk, e.g. the models of risk 
internally used by banks, which are then the basis upon which their supervision is carried 
out. Banks’ supervisors can only assess whether banks’ models make sense and whether 
banks stick to these models, but no innovations or suggestions come from the official sector. 
It is inevitable, therefore, that ideas like indirect regulation and due diligence are preferred to 
other options, even if these ideas are likely to increase the conflict between public and 
private interests, as shown in Section 3.  
 
The second co--ordinate of knowledge of the regulatory discourse is the efficiency--
enhancing role attributed to hedge funds. The argument that hedge funds are efficiency--
enhancers was not only a justification against the regulation of hedge funds but shaped the 
mindset of decision--makers in any venue where the issue was debated. Section 2 explained 
that this argument draws on one of the main tenets of modern finance – the EMH. The 
debate on hedge funds could not be understood without this element, which produced the 
very dilemma the article talks about: any regulatory action against hedge funds is balanced 
against the perspective that it could undermine the positive role hedge funds play in the 
market. Section 2 showed that this efficiency explanation has been increasingly contested 
and that data to quantify hedge funds’ contribution in this sense is missing. This, however, 
has not made the efficiency argument any less attractive. Despite being criticized by different 
 33
approaches, the EMH has shown a spectacular resilience.  This can be explained by the fact 
that the EMH has become embodied in an ‘apparatus’ made up of theories but also of 
administrative and legislative decisions that keep drawing on and referring to it. Many 
regulatory debates in the recent history make reference to the role of the EMH. For instance, 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) which the US Congress passed in 2000, 
made easier and cheaper the use of short selling, one of the most distinctive features of 
hedge fund investing. The justification was once again the desirability of introducing 
efficiency--enhancing instruments into the market (Jenkins 2000). Indeed the whole debate 
on short selling, both in the US and in other advanced financial markets (e.g. the UK), is 
centered on the principles of Fama’s theory.    
 
The regulatory discourse on hedge funds, which revolves around efficiency and financial 
stability, narrowed the policy space in Basel. First, it was difficult to discuss any regulation of 
hedge funds without triggering a chorus of protest over the negative impact on efficiency 
and liquidity that such a move would entail. Second, it was difficult to discuss anything 
outside the dominant concern with financial stability as defined in this section. Not only 
market integrity, but also the distributive impact of hedge--fund investing (like in the case of 
arbitrageurs riding the bubble, see Section 1) and other ethical concerns were not formulated 
as problems at the FSF.  
 
The three political economy explanations outlined in Sections 3 to 5 lead to different policy 
options. While the first and the second explanation lead to policy options in favor of greater 
inclusion of non--G--7 countries in the governance of global finance (Griffith Jones 2002; 
2003), the third explanation calls for greater conceptual inclusiveness. This means calling for 
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a reevaluation of the major tenets of financial market regulation and in particular of the two 
major goals of financial stability and efficiency.   
 
Conclusions 
The article has defined and dealt with the regulatory debate on hedge funds carried out at the 
Financial Stability Forum in Basel. Since 1998, hedge funds have been among the most 
debated instruments of financial markets. Discussions have focused on their ability to 
manipulate markets, affect financial stability and, more recently, defraud investors. Yet any 
call for their regulation has been accompanied by fierce contestation, with the end result 
often being a ‘much ado about nothing’.  
 
The article argued that the dispute over whether hedge funds should or should not be 
regulated cannot be resolved at the technical level, that is, by analysing available empirical 
evidence. The empirical evidence brought forward to prove whether hedge funds are 
affecting stability and market integrity – the two main concerns this article focused on – is 
far from being straightforward. In addition, finance explanations are often biased in favour 
of hedge funds because of the role they are assigned within the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
 
The article then considered a political economy explanation and looked at the power--issues 
that (1) emerged at the FSF decision--making level, (2) were embodied within the broader 
institutional setting in Basel, and (3) rested in the regulatory discourse over hedge funds. 
Section 3 to 5 developed this three--facet political economy answer.  
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Section 3 pointed to the difficulty of reaching a solution at the international level when too 
diverse interests are brought to the regulatory table. It specifically illustrated the conflict of 
interest between emerging markets on the one hand and G--7 countries on the other and 
highlighted the role of US authorities in defending a ‘light--hand’ solution to the hedge fund 
problem (Eichengreen 2003). It also illustrated how this solution moved the conflict away 
from the decision-making process in Basel and made it into a conflict of private versus 
public interests. 
 
Section 4 reinforced this view by looking at the role of the institutional setting where the 
debate took place. The FSF debate was hosted by a G--7 driven institution that invited 
within its structure a few non--G7 countries. The procedural rules of the FSF debate were 
biased towards the preferences of its main constituencies since the outset.  
 
The article observed, however, that both the first and second political-economy explanations 
presuppose a clearly--defined conflict between two groups of countries/regulators. This 
overlooks the fact that many issues in finance, especially when the level of technical 
sophistication is high, do not necessarily trigger an overt battle of interests. It might be the 
way issues are problematized that shapes the fate of a policy initiative. The third leg of this 
political economy explanation thus went on to look at the regulatory discourse within which 
issues of hedge funds were debated and analysed how this discourse narrowed the political 
space in Basel. The two coordinates of this discourse were identified in the efficiency--role 
attributed to hedge funds and in the concept of financial systemic stability. The former made 
it difficult to discuss any regulation of hedge funds without triggering a chorus of protest 
over the negative impact on efficiency and liquidity that such a move would entail. The latter 
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made it difficult to discuss anything outside the dominant concern with financial stability as 
defined in Section 5. In this context, increasing the geographical inclusiveness of the FSF 
without rethinking the tenets of financial market regulation might not serve the purpose. 
Inclusiveness, in other words, needs to be conceptual before geographical and sectoral. 
 
                                                 
1 The power of hedge funds to precipitate currency and equity market crises by taking large and concentrated 
positions (issues of market dynamics) and by using aggressive trading strategies (issues of market integrity).  
2 The domino effect that the sudden liquidation of a highly--leveraged hedge fund could have on the financial 
system. 
3 Doing ‘contrarian investing’ means doing the opposite of what other investors do.  
4 This rule is written in the US Investment Company Act of 1940 and in similar legislations in other advanced 
industrial countries. 
5 The other two issues where offshore centers and capital flows.  
6 The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) gathers representatives of the four major US 
regulators: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), the US Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
7 Net open interest is the sum of all positions of all sign in a market. 
8 Pillar II was addressed by a special task force, the Task Force on Market Dynamics, which visited 6 countries 
where hedge funds were active in 1998: South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong 
Kong.  
9 Eichengreen also talks of the divergent interests within the emerging market group, with Latin American 
countries being on average less willing to regulate hedge funds than their Asian counterparts. 
10 The industry was adamantly against it for two main reasons: (1) as the largest players in these markets are 
few, it is easy for the market to spot those who have open positions and trade against them; and (2) data would 
have been incorrect and approximate. These reasons have never been verified. 
11 It was the US President Working Group (PWG) that first praised the CRMPG initiative and called the hedge 
fund industry to follow their footsteps. 
12 The MWGED is an ad hoc working group set up in June of 1999 at the Bank for International Settlements 
with the purpose of formulating recommendations for improving the public disclosure practices of financial 
intermediaries.  
13 In this debate, the words ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision’ are often used interchangeably. In concrete, the word 
supervision would be the most appropriate. Banks in fact are under the supervision of central banks or national 
agencies. Regulatory measures, however, which supposedly are more stringent, co--exist with supervisory ones. 
Many reports (e.g. Fed Trading Manual) talk of both supervision and regulation. This seems to be the wisest 
solution, since the line between regulation and supervision is blurred. 
14 Repurchase agreements (repo) are agreements in which one party (seller or dealer) sells a security to another 
party and agrees to repurchase it on a specified date at a specified price. The security serves as collateral against 
the obligation of the borrower and does not become the property of the lender. Contracts for difference 
(CFDs) are agreements to exchange at the closing of the contract the difference between the initial and the final 
price of an equity multiplied by the number of equities in the contract.  
15 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulates and supervises national banks and supervises 
the federal branches and agencies of foreign banks. The Fed supervises state member banks and international 
banks that have an office in the US.  
16 For a literature on new institutionalism in IPE see for instance Young 1996; Keohane 1988 and 1989; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993. For a literature on historical institutionalism see Germain 1997 and 1999; 
Steinmo and Thelen 1992; for an attempt to synthesize the two literatures see Hall and Taylor 1996 and 1998; 
and Hay and Wincott 1998. 
17 The UNDP, for instance, has promoted financial stability as a global public good together with market 
efficiency (Griffith--Jones 2003). 
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